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Note
Re-viewing History: The Use of the Past as
Negative Precedent in United States v. Virginia
Deborah A. Widiss
"Our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex
discrimination."' Twenty-five years ago, a plurality of the Supreme Court
admitted a truth long known to many. Modem Americans must still struggle
with this history of discrimination. Its effects continue to be felt, less
obvious but ongoing. What role, then, does history play for the modem
world? What role can it play in the ongoing effort to move towards a deeper
realization of equality? There is, of course, no single answer.2
One way to approach these questions is to recognize that many of the
standards used in equal protection jurisprudence-in race as well as sex
discrimination cases-are designed in reference to a past that is now almost
universally recognized to be "wrong." State actors may not depend on
"overbroad" generalizations to make "judgments about people that are
likely to... perpetuate historical patterns of discrimination." 3 Qualified
individuals may not be excluded from activities based on "fixed notions
1. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
2. For a recent interdisciplinary collection of articles on the use of history in law, see
Symposium on the Critical Use of History, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1023-1221 (1997). See also
Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition, Change, and the Idea of Progress in Feminist Legal Thought,
1995 WIS. L. REV. 303 (summarizing approaches that feminist legal scholars have taken towards
history and tradition); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57 (1984)
(summarizing and critiquing the traditional vision of "law-in-history that has tended
to ... dominate liberal legal scholarship" and introducing approaches taken by Critical Legal
Scholars); John Philip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1707 (1996) (using
traditional concepts of historical scholarship to criticize lawyers' use of history); Symposium,
Moments of Change: Transformation in American Constitutionalism, 108 YALE L.J. (forthcoming
June 1999) (discussing the use of history in legal interpretation).
3. J.E.B.v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.11 (1994).
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concerning the roles and abilities of males and females." 4 And, once such
tests have determined that a given exclusion is unconstitutional, a proper
remedy strives to "eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past" and to
"bar like discrimination in the future." 5
But such self-consciously revolutionary equal protection standards
function within a legal system premised on precedent. There is a tension
inherent in a jurisprudence that defines itself in counter-distinction to the
past, yet works within a structure that embraces a conservative adherence to
past decisions as precedent. In United States v. Virginia,6 a case challenging
the Virginia Military Institute's (VMI) all-male admissions policy, the
school defended its exclusionary practice as a necessary and legitimate
expression of its long-celebrated traditions. Writing for a six-justice
majority, Justice Ginsburg used historical analogies to turn the school's
arguments upside down and thus discredit its claims as antiquated and
anachronistic. This Note develops a theory of "negative precedent" that
rationalizes the role history played in the VMI case and, more generally, the
constructive role that history can, and does, play in areas of the law where
the past no longer merits emulation.
Part I begins by diagramming the logical structure of an argument from
precedent and summarizing standard rationales put forward as justifications
for adherence to precedent. Negative precedent inverts familiar legal
reasoning. Abandoned past practices can be used to argue, through a
process of negative inference, against analogous modem practices. Equally
important, negative precedent acknowledges the injuries caused by past
practices that now seem unacceptable.
A close reading of the VMI decision fleshes out this theory. Part II
gives background on the case and then shows how Justice Ginsburg's
treatment of the standard of scrutiny--defining intermediate scrutiny as
requiring an "exceedingly persuasive" justification-shifts the tenor of the
Court's analysis by positing a "biased" observer who views examples of
sex-based classifications as presumptively invalid. Such skeptical scrutiny
ensures that the reader will recognize unqualified examples of historical
discrimination as negative precedent.
Parts III and IV illustrate uses of negative precedent. VMI claimed that
women could not be allowed to participate in the school's famous
adversative training method because the changes that would be required to
include them would destroy the effectiveness of the program. In other
words, the school asserted that it faced a catch-22. Part III shows how
Justice Ginsburg drew historical analogies to similar past assertions, now
4. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,725 (1982).
5. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
6. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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disproved, to defuse the school's arguments. Part IV demonstrates that by
emphasizing the changing legal standard, negative precedent also allowed
Justice Ginsburg to recognize the injury done to women by institutional
discrimination that would now be judged unconstitutional.
Since history does not come with labels attached, a reference to the past
may sound positive to some and negative to others. Part V discusses the
risks that history's contestability poses for the use of negative precedent
and confronts the possibility that an appeal to tradition may actually
advocate for change. It concludes by suggesting that a richer view of
tradition as both positive and negative allows progress to be grounded in
history. Finally, a brief epilogue in Part VI suggests that negative precedent
can also serve as a model for reform. Recognizing the central role that
negative precedent played in this important decision deepens an
understanding of the present value of the past.
I. THEORY AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PRECEDENT
The theory of negative precedent proposed in this Note builds on
scholarly treatments of the standard use of precedent. Section A presents
fairness, predictability, and efficiency rationales typically advanced as
justifications for adherence to the past, as well as a separate tradition-based
rationale developed by Anthony Kronman.7 So long as the societal
consensus remains unchanged, a reference to a past decision simultaneously
serves all of these rationales. But in areas of the law such as equal
protection jurisprudence, sometimes judges are willing to sacrifice
predictability and efficiency to satisfy changing understandings of equality
and fairness. In such cases, predictability and efficiency are best served by
ignoring the no-longer-controlling precedent. The traditionalist justification
and a different conception of fairness, by contrast, mandate that the past not
be forgotten. Section B constructs a theory of "negative precedent" that
provides an analytic framework for rationalizing the ongoing use of such
past precedents.
A. (Positive) Precedent
The bare bones of an argument from precedent are both familiar and
easily stated: Because X was treated a given way, a similar case, X', should
be decided the same way.' The first step of an argument from precedent is
7. See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990).
8. The schematic description of the mechanics and traditional justifications for precedent that
follows is adapted from Frederick Schauer's comprehensive treatment of the subject. See
Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987); see also id. at 571 n.3 (listing other
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factual. Since the facts of the second situation will never match those of the
first exactly, the argument begins by showing that cases are relevantly
similar.9 That is necessarily a process of abstraction: Extraneous details of
the two fact patterns are stripped away to reveal essential facts that define
the universe of Xs. Once a judge determines that X' is "like" X, the case is
decided. A pure rule of precedent dictates absolutely that the later case (and
any and all other members of the universe of Xs) be resolved in the same
way. The precedent controls simply because it is prior; the deference
awarded the past decision is not premised on the merit of the given
decision. It has force even if the result it requires is by some measure
"wrong."
Thus, an argument from precedent can be distinguished from the more
common (and often overlapping) argument from experience. In an
argument from experience, the past is used as a means of making decisions
in the present, but the past decision carries no weight beyond what it can
teach about the present. In other words, "[t]he probability that the present
[situation] will be like the past both determines and exhausts the value of
the previous experience." 10 If society thinks that the past decision was
rightly decided, then an argument from experience will suggest the same
result as an argument from precedent. But if the past decision now seems
erroneous or if the result it requires for the current case is in some sense
less than ideal, then the argument from experience leads to a different result
than the argument from precedent.
What can justify adherence to a past decision if it is likely that
following it results in a present mistake? Three claims are standard
throughout the literature.1 The first suggests that fairness dictates that like
cases be treated alike regardless of when they occur. The second argument
posits that consistent decisions benefit individuals by allowing them to plan
their lives sensibly around a predictable set of rules. And the third
recognizes that adhering to precedent promotes efficient decisionmaking
and builds confidence in decisionmaking institutions. Following past
decisions is functionally necessary because time only flows forward, but it
authors' standard treatments of precedent). Schauer's highly influential work has been used by
numerous commentators as a starting point for discussions of the justifications for deferring to
precedent. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Rules and Reversibility, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1415,
1415 (1997); Kronman, supra note 7, at 1037-39; Gerald I. Postema, Integrity: Justice in
Workclothes, 82 IOwA L. REv. 821, 821 (1997); Mark Tushnet, Self-Formalism, Precedent, and
the Rule of Law, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1583, 1583 n.a (1997).
9. See Schauer, supra note 8 at 576-88 (discussing how categories of relevance are
established).
10. Id at575.
11. The following discussion is adapted from Schauer's article. For a full description, see id.
at 595-602.
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is not particularly significant that these cases are part of history.12 Precedent
achieves rational goals that are inherently ahistorical.
The fairness, predictability, and efficiency rationales use the past as a
means to an end, rather than an end in itself. Therefore, they cannot explain
(and in fact, as will be discussed below, they actually argue against)
reference to past cases that are no longer considered controlling precedent.
In other words, they do not explain the use of negative precedent. Anthony
Kronman, however, presents a distinct claim for adherence to precedent that
is explicitly premised on the pastness of the decision: tradition. 3 Arguing
that an ability to remember across generations is an essential and distinctive
element of human nature, he concludes that humans are born into a contract
of "interwoven obligations." 4 Each generation has a duty to preserve the
achievements of its ancestors: "The past is not something that we, as
already constituted human beings, choose for one reason or another to
respect; rather, it is such respect that establishes our humanity in the first
place." " If "respecting" the past is an integral part of living as humans in
the present, what should we do with aspects of the past that no longer seem
to merit respect?
B. Negative Precedent
Strict adherence to precedent is inherently conservative. If the societal
consensus about the appropriateness of a given opinion is maintained, a
reference to the decision simultaneously serves the fairness, predictability,
efficiency, and traditionalist rationales. As society grows and changes,
however, some past decisions come to seem "wrong." In some cases,
legislative bodies explicitly change the status quo. For example, the
Reconstruction amendments were designed to rectify inegalitarian practices
that existed at the time and that in the absence of corrective measures would
12. See Kronman, supra note 7, at 1041 ("Since the past cannot be undone, the only way to
treat later cases like (identical) earlier ones is to conform the later cases to them; this is a
consequence of the rather obvious fact that time flows in one direction only."). Time only flows
one way, but a similar "fairness" argument also can be used in the present with bearing on the
future: Consider the common environmental plea that natural resources should be routinely
conserved and pollution should be abated because it is "unfair" that future generations should
suffer simply because they were born later. See generally, e.g., EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN
FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS (1989) (arguing that each generation has a duty to pass on
the Earth in a condition at least as good as that in which it received it and a duty to repair any
damage done by the failure of previous generations to do the same).
13. See id at 1043-68. For other commentary on Kronman's argument, see Bartlett,
supra note 2, at 306-08; and David Luban, Legal Traditionalism, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1035, 1040-60
(1991).
14. Kronman, supra note 7, at 1067.
15. Id at 1066.
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have been expected to endure. 6 And occasionally, cases are explicitly
overruled, thus obviously discrediting any precedential value they would
otherwise have. More frequently, however, judge-made law grows past
"wrong" decisions or expands the protection offered by a given legal rule
through a process of distinguishing, one that functions without explicitly
discrediting the past. 7
The several rationales for precedent then pull in different directions.
The predictability and efficiency justifications do not offer any reason for
ongoing reference to the original rule. To the contrary, referring to a case
decided in a manner different from the prevailing precedent undermines the
illusion of stability on which these utilitarian rationales depend. Thus,
precedent best serves its utilitarian objectives by presenting a single
controlling rule as if it has always existed and will stretch out endlessly into
the future. Outdated cases should be ignored. History, ironically, should be
erased. But the traditionalist rationale for precedent combined with fairness
considerations justify ongoing reference to no-longer-controlling case law.
Such obsolete standards constitute "negative precedent.""1
The formal structure of an argument from negative precedent simply
inverts the familiar argument from precedent. The result reached in X is
now considered "wrong." X', a current situation, resembles X. Again, the
first step is factual: The current situation must be shown to be relevantly
similar to the past case. In an argument from precedent, proving the
similarity mandated that the later case reach the same result as the earlier
one. In an argument from negative precedent, this process is reversed: Since
16. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the
Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1174 (1988).
17. This is a common practice. A current situation, X, is similar to X. Assume that society
now considers the original result "wrong." Since the first step in the decisionmaking process is
factual, a different treatment of X'can be justified by showing that it is different from X.
Distinguishing X' thus becomes a means to an end: establishing a new controlling precedent for
the universe of Xs. X' then becomes a baseline; its scope is gradually expanded until it applies to
the entire universe of Xs (and thus implicitly includes the original X). Arguments made back to the
original case then would be futile. Distinguishing presents the possibility of a progressive, one-
directional growth without any explicit denunciation of the rule of precedent. For a recent and
well-known example of this, see the progression from Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980),
which found a federal affirmative action program constitutional under intermediate scrutiny; to
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), which held a municipal affirmative
action program modeled on the one approved in Fullilove to be unconstitutional under strict
scrutiny and distinguished Fullilove on the ground that Congress, but not Richmond, has an
affirmative grant of power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause; to Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), which announced a policy of congruence that, expanding Croson
and discounting Fullilove, required courts to evaluate federal affirmative action programs under
strict scrutiny.
18. A related, but logically distinct, practice is citing a dissent from a now discredited
decision to lend support for the opposite proposition. Judges, litigators, and commentators do this
with some regularity; the dissents most commonly cited are probably Justice Harlan's in Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896), and Justice Holmes's in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,
74 (1905).
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the original case was wrongly decided, proving the similarity mandates that
the current case yield the opposite-or at least a different-result. The
"wrong" answer in the past requires the "right" answer now.19
While less familiar than positive precedent, negative precedent exists,
and it serves (at least) two important objectives: (1) it offers a means of
arguing by negative inference that can further progressive change; and (2) it
recognizes a historic injury. The first use of negative precedent, argument
by negative inference, is important because societal change is not
monolithic. Increased access to institutions and greater equality are
achieved only gradually. As courts and legislatures require progressive
reform, some members of society-including many members of the
institutions that are forced to adapt-fear that such change will destroy the
unique qualities of these institutions. Even if they accept that some cases in
the past were wrongly decided, they think that the current situation has
nothing to do with the now discredited past. In other words, they think that
X is not "relevantly similar" to X. Showing that the present situation is
actually like the past requires that the present situation be changed.
The second justification for the use of negative precedent is backward-
looking. Broadly speaking, traditionalism is a realization of humans' unique
ability to remember across generations. Kronman focuses on the
"achievements" and "accomplishments" of the past,2 but the past in this
sense is not prescriptive. Remembering the achievements of our ancestors is
important; remembering their mistakes is equally important. The "fairness"
premise-that individuals at different times should be treated the same-
underlines the significance of this assertion. If distinctions drawn today
between the capabilities of men and women are generally considered
illegitimate, then, since temporal differences are similarly immaterial,
distinctions drawn in the past between men and women were similarly
illegitimate. In other words, if men and women are equal today, they should
have been equal in the past as well. And if the past really does matter-if
19. Note that if the original shift away from X was through a process of distinguishing rather
than an explicit overruling, see supra note 17, arguing from past precedent in this manner is
essentially "undistinguishing."
20. See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 7, at 1051. David Luban, noting this tendency, suggests
that Kronman's reasoning is fatally flawed, in part by its failure to admit explicitly that some
historical actions are not worth following. See Luban, supra note 13, at 1056-57. I think Luban is
unfair in his criticism. Kronman does not suggest that we must slavishly adhere to all of the
actions of the past. Nor does he ignore the possibility of intergenerational progress. Rather,
Kronman circumscribes his conclusions: As humans, "we are bound, within limits, to respect [the
past] for its own sake .... Kronman, supra note 7, at 1066 (emphasis added). See also id. at
1039 ("[The past deserves to be respected merely because it is the past-not, of course,
uncritically or unconditionally, but for its own sake nonetheless." (emphasis added)). Luban's
critique, however, is important in recognizing the limits of the traditionalist argument as described
in Kronman's article. But rather than discarding Kronman's underlying premise, I suggest moving
the lines to expand the scope.
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the memory of the past is an essential expression of humanity-then
recognizing past inequities is an important means of recognizing the
justness of a past claim that was denied.
The two objectives of negative precedent correspond to the two aspects
of a legal opinion: A written opinion both decides a specific factual dispute
between litigants at a particular point in history and establishes a rule of
law that will control similar factual disputes in the future. For the sake of
convenience, I will refer to the former as the "historical" aspect of the
opinion and the latter as the "legal" import of the opinion. A society's
intergenerational memory is best expressed by emphasizing the "history":
the particular circumstances of the case and the identifying characteristics
of the individuals. 1 The fairness, predictability, and efficiency objectives,
by contrast, are concerned with the "law" of the opinion, and stare decisis
canonizes the importance of adhering to the "law" established in earlier
cases. Where explicitly discredited or clearly abandoned, however, case law
loses this prescribed precedential weight. Instead the past case becomes
"merely" a historical event. Nevertheless, a reference to a past decision
continues to include both a "historical" and a "legal" component, in the
sense that it refers both to the (wrong) resolution of the particular factual
dispute and to the (wrong) rule of law established by the case. An argument
from negative precedent operates along both these vectors. The use of a
negative inference to discredit a current claim corresponds to the "legal"
import of the decision; the backward-looking righting of a past wrong
corresponds to the "historical" effect of the decision.
The distinction I have drawn between "law" and "history" is, of
course, artificial. Speaking more generally, the "legal" aspect of precedent
can be found acting in nonlegal institutions, and the "historic" aspect of
precedent plays a role in legal decisions. In other words, even nonlegal
institutions tend to abide by their own decisions as a means of achieving
21. Kronman introduces the traditionalist approach as an alternative explanation for a
society's reference to the past both "in the law and outside it." Id. at 1047. Any reference to a
past legal decision expresses a society's intergenerational memory and, because law adheres to
precedent (in part to achieve fairness, predictability, and efficiency), law serves such traditionalist
impulses by its ongoing reference to past decisions. But the key to the traditionalist argument is
not that the past event is a legal event; reference to a Renaissance play or the restoration of a
crumbling cathedral serves tradition as well. See id. at 1053-55. In fact, a legal opinion is an
imperfect means of expressing society's intergenerational memory precisely because it also serves
to promote fairness, predictability, and efficiency. Whereas the traditionalist rationale would
emphasize the particular personalities involved, see id. at 1065, the utilitarian objectives of
precedent require a process of abstraction that creates (at least the illusion of) a controlling
precedent distinct from individual fact patterns. See supra text accompanying note 9. For an
influential discussion of the significance of such depersonalization, see John Noonan's analysis of
the decisions in, and the legal commentary on, Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99
(N.Y. 1928), in JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OFTHE LAW 111-51 (1976).
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fairness, efficiency, and predictability.22 Likewise, legal decisionmakers
frequently look to nonlegal history as a means of making legal
determinations.' Negative precedent also relies both on past cases and
other historical events. A past legal decision, such as upholding a statute
that prohibited women from bartending, may now seem "wrong."
Similarly, a decision by a private institution, such as excluding women
from attending law school, may also now seem "wrong." Either of these
decisions can be cited as an example of a past mistake, and, as the
discussion of the VMI case will make clear, either can serve as negative
precedent.24
II. THE VMI LITIGATION: PROVIDING A CONTEXT
FOR THE USE OF NEGATIVE PRECEDENT
Negative precedent both argues against contemporary practices and
acknowledges historic injuries. Part I presented these objectives as if they
were logically distinct. They are not. Using a past example to advocate for a
change in the present also implicitly revalues the past. But this phenomenon
is hard to understand in the abstract. Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion in
United States v. Virginia demonstrates the use of negative precedent. This
Part gives background on the litigation and the treatment of the standard of
scrutiny. Parts III, IV, and V illustrate aspects of negative precedent in
action.
A. Litigation in the Lower Courts
United States v. Virginia received extensive national media coverage
and has already spawned a host of law review articles.2 6 Therefore, I will
22. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 8, at 572 (noting that such reasoning is familiar even in
such nonlegal institutions as the family).
23. For example, due process protects "fundamental liberties" that are often defined as those
"deeply rooted" in the country's traditions. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192
(1986) (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). For an influential discussion
of the way in which the Equal Protection Clause positions itself against deep-seated traditions
while the Due Process Clause is used to maintain such traditions, see Sunstein, supra note 16.
24. See infra Parts III and IV.
25. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
26. For a comprehensive treatment of VMI's own history, see Dianne Avery, Institutional
Myths, Historical Narratives and Social Science Evidence: Reading the "Record" in the Virginia
Military Institute Case, 5 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 189 (1996). Avery argues that the
school created a largely artificial rhetoric of "unchanging" traditions as a strategic element of its
defense, but that in fact the school-including its famed adversative method-has evolved greatly
over time. For a different perspective on the narrative strategies employed in the case, see Valorie
K. Vojkik, At War: Narrative Tactics in the Citadel and VMI Litigation, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
1 (1996). Vojdik suggests that the school cast itself as a "single-gender" college rather than a
traditional male military college to shift the focus away from the exclusion of women and argues
1998]
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provide only a brief introduction. Founded in 1839, the Virginia Military
Institute had never admitted women; when the litigation began, VMI was
Virginia's only public single-sex institution of higher learning.' It had also
traditionally been the only Virginia institution whose mission was creating
"citizen soldiers."28 To achieve this objective, it developed a unique
"adversative method" that featured "'[p]hysical rigor, mental stress,
absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, minute regulation of
behavior, and indoctrination in desirable values." 29
In addition to its adversative method, VMI offered a full selection of
liberal arts, sciences, and engineering courses, comparable to-or better
than-the curriculum offered at other public colleges and universities in
Virginia. Many members of its faculty had Ph.D.s or other advanced
degrees, and its library holdings were extensive. VMI graduates
traditionally have gone on to achieve a high degree of success in both
military and civilian life. Current graduates thus enjoyed access to a
"'network of business owners, corporations, VMI graduates and non-
graduate employers... interested in hiring VMI graduates."' 3  Alumni
affection for the school was demonstrated by the generosity of their
financial support; VMI boasted the largest per-pupil endowment in the
nation."
Between 1988 and 1990, VMI received 347 letters from women
inquiring about the possibility of attending the school.32 In 1990, a female
high school student who was summarily denied admission to VMI filed a
that that the absence of individual plaintiffs in the VMI litigation disadvantaged the United States
because it was unable to harness narrative sympathies. See also Larry CatA Backer, Reading
Entrails: Romer, VMI and the Art of Divining Equal Protection, 32 TULSA L.J. 361 (1997);
Lucinda M. Finley, Sex-Blind, Separate But Equal, or Anti-subordination? The Uneasy Legacy of
Plessy v. Ferguson for Sex and Gender Discrimination, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1089 (1996). For
fuller treatments of the history of the case itself and the particular implications that the decision
will have for VMI, see, for example, Raymond F. Runyon, Note, VMI and Virginia Lose Again:
United States v. Virginia, 32 TULSA L.J. 681,702-05 (1997) (filling in the context for many of the
concerns that Justice Scalia expresses in his dissent); Collin O'Connor Udell, Note, Signaling a
New Direction in Gender Classification Scrutiny: United States v. Virginia, 29 CONN. L. REV.
521 (1996) (situating the decision within gender equal protection jurisprudence); and Shanon M.
Gregor, Case Comment, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Gender Discrimination: The
Virginia Military Institute Is Given the Opportunity to Create "Citizen-Soldiers" out of Qualified
Women, 73 N.D. L. REV. 323 (1997) (giving a positive reading of the changes required by the
decision and recounting the case's history).
27. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 520. The following background is based on the
material that Justice Ginsburg provided in her majority opinion. See id. at 520-30, 547-54. The
decisions for the two waves of litigation can be found at United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp.
1407 (W.D. Va. 1991); 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992); 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994); and 44
F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995).
28. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 522.
29. Id.
30. lId at 552 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 499).
31. See id.
32. See id. at 523.
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complaint with the Attorney General, and the United States sued the
Commonwealth of Virginia, VMI, and others responsible for the operation
of VMI, alleging that the school's categorical exclusion of women violated
the Equal Protection Clause.33 The proceedings were bifurcated. In the first
round of litigation on the liability question, the district court upheld the
school's admissions policy,' but the Fourth Circuit found it
unconstitutional. It remanded the case, suggesting that the state might be
able to remedy the constitutional violation by establishing "parallel
institutions." "5
Virginia therefore established the Virginia Women's Institute for
Leadership (VWIL), a four-year, publicly funded undergraduate program
housed at Mary Baldwin College, a private women's college. While VWIL
purportedly shared VMI's mission of producing "citizen soldiers," it did so
through a "cooperative method which reinforces self-esteem."3 6 Mary
Baldwin offered considerably fewer science classes, its faculty held
significantly fewer degrees, and its endowment was substantially smaller
than that of VMI. Justice Ginsburg provided a comparison of the schools'
athletic facilities that reads like a parody:
For physical training, Mary Baldwin has "two multi-purpose
fields" and "[o]ne gymnasium." VMI has "an NCAA competition
level indoor track and field facility; a number of multi-purpose
fields; baseball, soccer and lacrosse fields; an obstacle course; large
boxing, wrestling and martial arts facilities; an 11-laps-to-the-mile
indoor running course; an indoor pool; indoor and outdoor rifle
ranges; and a football stadium that also contains a practice field and
outdoor track." 37
Despite these differences, the district court and the Fourth Circuit both
found that VWIL remedied Virginia's constitutional violation. 8
On appeal, there were two questions before the Supreme Court: Did
VMI's exclusively male admissions policy violate the Equal Protection
Clause? If so, did VWIL provide an adequate remedy?39
33. See id.
34. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1415.
35. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d at 900.
36. United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 476.
37. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 552 (internal citations omitted).
38. See United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 484; 44 F.3d at 1241.
39. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 530-3 1.
19981
The Yale Law Journal
B. Skeptical Scrutiny Posits a Presumption of Illegitimacy
Justice Ginsburg, writing for a six-justice majority, announced the
opinion of the Court. Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a brief concurrence, and
Justice Scalia wrote a passionate dissent. Each discussed the standard of
scrutiny. Justice Ginsburg articulated a "skeptical scrutiny" standard: The
state must provide an "exceedingly persuasive justification" to sustain a
gender-based classification against an equal protection challenge.40 VWIL,
she found, failed to provide an adequate remedy for the constitutional
violation.4' The Chief Justice agreed with the outcome of the decision but
disapproved of Justice Ginsburg's shift from the traditional articulation of
the intermediate scrutiny standard: Gender-based classifications "'must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related
to achievement of those objectives."' 4 Justice Scalia denounced the
changed wording of the standard of scrutiny and argued that since
intermediate scrutiny traditionally had required only a "substantial relation
between end and means, not a perfect fit,"43 VMI's policy should have
passed intermediate scrutiny.44
Much has been-and will be-written about how much the skeptical
scrutiny standard differs from the original formulation of intermediate
scrutiny and what it means for future sex-discrimination claims.45 Clearly,
Justice Ginsburg intended to nudge the standard toward strict scrutiny.46 For
the purposes of this Part of the Note, however, it is important only to
recognize that the rearticulated standard established a presumption of
40. ld. at 531 (quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136-37 & n.6 (1994);
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,724 (1982)).
41. See id. at 555-56.
42. Id. at 558 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976)).
43. ld. at 573 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
44. See id. at 576-79. (Scalia, J., dissenting)
45. See generally Backer, supra note 26, at 365-70 (suggesting that since Justice Ginsburg's
opinion lays the groundwork for a move to strict scrutiny for gender classifications, "the
intermediate courts may take the hint and make it increasingly impossible for the high court to
contain the language of the opinion"); Christina Gleason, Comment, United States v. Virginia:
Skeptical Scrutiny and the Future of Gender Discrimination Law, 70 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 801
(1996) (reviewing the evolution of standards of scrutiny in challenges to gender classifications
and suggesting that the Justices are very close to applying strict scrutiny); and Udell, supra note
26 (same).
46. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532 ("Without equating gender classifications,
for all purposes, to classifications based on race or national origin, the Court, in post-Reed
decisions, has carefully inspected official action that closes a door or denies opportunity to women
(or to men)." (footnote omitted)). Justice Scalia accurately-though perhaps unnecessarily
caustically-characterized her treatment of this distinction as potentially misleading: "[Such
statements] suggest that we have not already categorically held strict scrutiny to be inapplicable to
sex-based classifications." Id. at 574 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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illegitimacy.47 Without necessarily raising the standard, it changed the tenor
of the analysis. The traditional intermediate scrutiny test posits an impartial
observer who is able to weigh a proffered objective to determine whether it
is "important" and then assess whether the gender-based classification is
"substantially related" to achieving this objective. He strives to remain free
of emotional entanglements. The evaluation is quasi-scientific and the law
is a set of rules that is applied to a given situation.
The "exceedingly persuasive" test, in contrast, requires that the judge
begin with a strong presumption that the gender-based classification is
invalid. To persuade means to induce another to embrace a point of view
different from that which the other originally held.4 Thus, the judge must
be "biased" against the classification such that only exceedingly
convincing objectives can "persuade" him to change his mind. This does
not mean that the judge may give free rein to his own emotions nor that he
can object to what is in fact an "exceedingly persuasive" justification on
the basis of his own personal opinion.49 It does mean that he will look at a
past example of prejudice and recognize it as wrong even if it is not
explicitly discredited. To be effective, Justice Ginsburg's use of negative
precedent requires such a presumption of illegitimacy.
I. NEGATIVE PRECEDENT: UNRAVELING THE CATCH-22
Virginia claimed that the changes needed to include women in the
adversative method would be so drastic that the method itself would cease
to be effective."0 In other words, as the appellate court put it, the situation
47. Justice Ginsburg's discussion of the standard of scrutiny is also striking in the emphasis it
places on the harm caused by the many years in which women were excluded from institutions
throughout American history. See infra Part IV.
48. "Persuade" means "[t]o induce to undertake a cause of action or embrace a point of view
by means of argument, reasoning, or entreaty." AMERiCAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1352 (3d ed. 1992). "Persuade" is distinguished from synonyms "induce,"
"prevail," and "convince" as meaning "to win someone over, as by reasons, advice, urging, or
personal forcefulness." Id. (emphasis added).
49. See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE, 53-78 (describing the role that
"rational emotions" can play in judging).
50. Virginia also claimed that its exclusion of women was justified because single-sex
education provides important educational benefits, see Virginia, 518 U.S. at 535 (quoting Brief for
Cross-Petitioners at 20, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107)),
and thus the option of single-sex education at VMI was a valuable contribution to the state's
"diversity in educational approaches," id. (quoting Brief for Cross-Petitioners, supra, at 25). This
argument merged ends and means. That is, to the extent that the Court accepted that single-sex
education provides considerable benefits, VM's policy obviously was substantially related to
achieving this benefit. Justice Ginsburg did not reach the thorny question of the validity of the
argument itself. Rather, she found that the argument failed because it was a post hoc
rationalization. Thus, what would have been a normative evaluation of the "importance" of
single-sex schools-and of considerable concern to the other few remaining public single-sex
schools-became a straightforward factual inquiry into the genuineness of Virginia's alleged
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was a catch-22: "[W]omen are denied the opportunity [of benefiting from
the adversative method] when excluded from VMI and cannot be given the
opportunity by admitting them, because the change caused by their
admission would destroy the opportunity.""1 Women could not win. Rather
than directly attack the premises of the catch-22, Justice Ginsburg used
historical examples to argue against the legitimacy of the claims through a
process of negative inference. Using a "wrong" rule of law from the past,
negative precedent argues for the opposite conclusion today. This Part
introduces the catch-22 and then engages in a close reading of the opinion
to illustrate the use of negative precedent.
A. The Catch-22
The so-called catch-22 resulted from the confluence of two related, but
logically distinct, sets of "findings" presented by the experts at the first
trial.52 The first had to do with the appropriateness of the adversative
method for women. Sociologists, physiologists, and professional educators
who testified on "gender-based developmental differences" suggested that,
in general, women would not do well in the adversative method because,
while "[m]ales tend to need an atmosphere of adversativeness," "[fJlemales
tend to thrive in a cooperative atmosphere." 5 3 It was established, however,
that "some women are capable of all the individual activities required of
VMI cadets." 
54
commitment to providing single-sex options as part of its commitment to diversity among
institutions.
Justice Ginsburg carefully qualified her statements about single-sex schools to leave open
the possibility that some such schools might pass equal protection scrutiny. See id. at 535-36 &
nn.7-8 (recognizing that "single-sex education affords pedagogical benefits to at least some
students" and thus might fit within a state's "prerogative evenhandedly to support diverse
educational opportunities"). Chief Justice Rehnquist was much more definite about the possibility
of single-sex schools. See id. at 565 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (suggesting that a state could
satisfy equal protection dictates by demonstrating that single-sex schools for men and women
respectively offer "the same quality of education and were of the same overall calibre").
Justice Ginsburg and Chief Justice Rehnquist both considered the relevant category for
comparison to be public institutions of higher education, and they found that the historical record
shows a clear trend towards dismantling single-sex schools. Since the only modem example of
VMI's purported interest in diversity was VMI itself, the Justices were unpersuaded by the state's
argument. See id. at 535-40 (majority opinion); id at 560-64 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Justice
Scalia, by contrast, assumed that the relevant category was institutions-both public and private-
in Virginia that receive public support. Noting that there were four private women's colleges that
receive some measure of state support, he argued that the state's claim should pass muster. See id.
at 576-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 897 (4th Cir. 1992) (footnote omitted).
52. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 541. The quotation marks qualifying "findings" are
Justice Ginsburg's.
53. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1434-35 (W.D.Va. 1991).
54. Id. at 1412.
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The second set of "findings" was an assessment of the magnitude of
the changes that VMI would have to make to include women.
Administrators at VMI and the federal military academies testified that the
school would have to modify the physical training requirements, the
traditional absolute absence of privacy, and the adversative approach 5 The
Fourth Circuit (and Justice Scalia) concluded that these changes would be
so grave as to make the program unworkable. 6 Moreover, the appellate
court apparently feared that allowing women to participate in the
adversative method would "destroy ... any sense of decency that still
permeates the relationship between the sexes." 57 Again, however, some
other portions of the stipulated facts suggested that the required changes
would not be unduly drastic,58 and VMI's success with racial integration
after making similar protests of impossibility showed that the adversative
method might be more flexible than Virginia claimed.59
The two sets of findings can be rearticulated more generally: (1)
learning in this method would be harmful for women; and (2) admitting
women would be harmful for the institution and for the relation between the
sexes. It was impossible to assess the legitimacy of these claims in the
course of the litigation. Until (and unless) women actually attended VMI,
there was no way to know exactly how women would respond to VMI's
unique method, nor was there any way to know exactly how much any
required changes to the method would affect the school's ability to realize
55. Id. at 1437-42.
56. See United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d at 896-97; 518 U.S. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57. United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1239 (4th Cir. 1995).
58. Following the Supreme Court's decision requiring integration of a female-only nursing
school in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), VMI commissioned a
Mission Study to evaluate its own status. The distict court's Findings in Connection with the 1990
Mission Study included evidence from West Point suggesting that the changes might be handled
without too much difficulty:
West Point provided generally favorable information concerning coeducation: (1) male
and female cadet attrition occurs for the same reasons; (2) resentment of female cadets
by male cadets has faded and "[a]cceptance is gained on the basis of individual
achievement"; (3) VMI graduates will "probably be considered disadvantaged in the
coed Army" because they do not come from a coed environment; (4) the introduction
of women did not significantly change West Point; (5) women perform and compete as
well as men in cadet basic training, cadet field training, and cadet advanced training,
which are summer training programs; (6) training for men and women is comparable,
but not identical, taking into account gender-based differences; (7) female cadets take
the same physical education courses as men, except that they take self defense instead
of boxing and wrestling; (8) the cost of educating a cadet did not rise significantly with
the admission of women; (9) there had been "no changes in the curriculum, procedures,
or facilities of the academic program because of the admission of women"; (10) female
cadets have had no trouble with the West Point honor system. "Women are
underrepresented in honor offenses," and "[t]he system is applied equally to men and
women"; and (11) gender integration has been successful, and "women's
accomplishments have excelled all anticipated levels."
United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1428 (quoting U.S. Ex. 68).
59. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at546 n.16.
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its mission. As the trial made clear, experts could be marshaled on both
sides of the debate.
Rather than basing her decision on the contradictory testimony
provided by the experts, Justice Ginsburg took a different approach: She
used negative precedent. Equal protection principles prohibit state actors
from relying on "'overbroad' generalizations based on "'fixed notions
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females"' to make
"'judgments about people that are likely to ... perpetuate historical
patterns of discrimination."' ' Thus, showing that Virginia's proffered
justifications relied on historical patterns of discrimination bolstered the
Government's case that those justifications were illegitimate.
B. The Adversative Method Is Not Appropriate for Women
Justice Ginsburg began by addressing the first premise: Women should
be protected from the adversative method.61 She noted that in 1839, when
VMI was founded, higher education in general (including of course the
adversative method) was "considered dangerous for women." 62 This was a
purely descriptive statement; it expressed neither approval nor disapproval
for the premise.
Justice Ginsburg supported the statement with a selection of quotations
from nineteenth-century medical experts. First, she summarized the
findings of the famous Dr. Edward Clarke:
Dr. Edward H. Clarke of Harvard Medical School, whose
influential book, Sex in Education, went through 17 editions, was
perhaps the most well-known speaker from the medical community
opposing higher education for women. He maintained that the
physiological effects of hard study and academic competition with
boys would interfere with the development of girls' reproductive
organs. 63
And then she quoted directly from his book:
60. ld at 541-42 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 725; J.E.B. v. Alabama
exreL T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.ll (1994)).
61. Justice Ginsburg actually reviewed the history of women's education in reference to the
state's proffered diversity justification, see supra note 50, but her treatment of the issue also
discredited Virginia's catch-22 claims.
62. Il at 536.
63. Ia at 536 n.9.
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"[I]dentical education of the two sexes is a crime before God and
humanity, that physiology protests against, and that experience
weeps over." 64
She went on to quote statements from two other contemporary experts, Dr.
Maudsley:
"It is not that girls have not ambition, nor that they fail generally to
run the intellectual race [in coeducational settings], but it is asserted
that they do it at a cost to their strength and health which entails
life-long suffering, and even incapacitates them for the adequate
performance of the natural functions of their sex." 65
and Dr. Meigs:
[A]fter five or six weeks of "mental and educational discipline," a
healthy woman would "lose. . . the habit of menstruation" and
suffer numerous ills as a result of depriving her body for the sake of
her mind.66
Justice Ginsburg presented each of these assertions without qualification.
They were simply statements made by experts about the ability of women
to learn with men. Now consider a finding of fact based on the testimony
offered by the school's expert witnesses, Dr. Richardson and Dr. Riesman:
Given these developmental differences females and males
characteristically learn differently. Males tend to need an
atmosphere of adversativeness or ritual combat in which the teacher
is a disciplinarian and a worthy competitor. Females tend to thrive
in a cooperative atmosphere in which the teacher is emotionally
connected with the students.67
In 1873, Dr. Clarke asserted that "academic competition with boys would
interfere with the development of girls' reproductive organs"; in 1874, Dr.
Maudsley asserted that girls "run the intellectual race.., at a cost to their
strength and health"; and in 1991, Dr. Richardson and Dr. Riesman gave
testimony suggesting that males need an "atmosphere of adversativeness"
while females need a "cooperative atmosphere." Although the modem
64. Id. (quoting EDWARD H. CLARKE, SEX IN EDUCATION 127 (Boston, James R. Osgood &
Co. 2d ed. 1873)).
65. Id. (quoting HENRY MAUDSLEY, SEX IN MIND AND IN EDUCATION 17 (n.p. 1874)).
66. Id. (quoting CHARLES D. MEIGS, FEMALES AND THEm DISEASES 350 (n.p. 1848)).
67. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1434 (W.D. Va. 1991) (predicating a factual
finding in part on Riesman Dep. 63-65, 95, 106-07; and on Richardson's testimony at Tr. 684-87,
692-93). Justice Ginsburg quoted from this portion of the District Court's opinion. See United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 541.
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assertion is somewhat different in tone, its substance is strikingly similar to
the nineteenth-century medical opinions.
Each of the nineteenth-century doctors was well-respected in his day,
just as VMI's experts are respected by at least some sectors of the medical
community today. Justice Ginsburg quoted from both sets of experts and
emphasized the parallelism. She listed the credentials of the nineteenth-
century Dr. Clarke purely descriptively: He was a Harvard Medical School
professor and a well-known speaker who wrote an influential and widely-
read book. These credentials would still qualify him as an "expert." In fact,
Dr. Riesman's credentials echo those of his nineteenth-century counterpart:
He, too, holds degrees from Harvard and has written several influential
books.68 Justice Ginsburg thus struck a blow at the legitimacy of the expert
testimony on which the catch-22 was constructed. Her examples showed
that degrees and books did not-and do not-guarantee truthful
conclusions.
All these experts claimed that certain gender-based developmental
differences made some modes of learning inappropriate for women. A
century ago such statements were used to deny women access to almost all
forms of higher education; VMI sought to use them in the same way today
to deny access to the adversative method. But readers will recognize that
the nineteenth-century experts were wrong. Allowing women to learn with
men neither interferes with their reproductive functions nor endangers their
health. More than one hundred years of coeducation have made this clear.
Justice Ginsburg suggested that women who want to learn at VI are
members of the more general category of women who want to learn with
men. Disallowing integrated learning because experts think it may be bad
for the women is wrong now just as it was wrong in the past. The negative
precedent discredits the present claims.
C. The Adversative Method Would Be Destroyed by the
Inclusion of Women
Justice Ginsburg also used negative precedent to discredit the other half
of the catch-22-VMI's claims that allowing women to attend the school
would destroy the institution and the remaining sense of decency between
68. The District Court established Dr. Riesman as an expert:
Dr. David Riesman, a professor of sociology at Harvard University, testified as a VMI
expert on education. He holds a bachelor's degree from Harvard College earned in
1931, and a law degree from Harvard Law School earned in 1934.... His publications
include The Lonely Crowd (1950), Constraint and Variety in American Education
(1956), The Academic Revolution (with Christopher Jencks, 1968), and On Higher
Education.
United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1416-17.
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the sexes. She began her treatment of the issue with a wry characterization
of the problem:
The notion that admission of women would downgrade VMI's
stature, destroy the adversative system and, with it, even the school,
is a judgment hardly proved, a prediction hardly different from
other "self-fulfilling prophec[ies]" once routinely used to deny
rights or opportunities.69
The wording of this passage is rich with double-entendre and understated
implications. "Notion" speaks to precedent, evoking the Court's self-given
mandate to smoke out and invalidate gender classifications that are based
on "fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and
females." 70 The word itself carries an aura of fancifulness and vagueness
with a tinge of old fogeyism; it does not suggest a well-reasoned
proposition.71 "Admission" is a similarly loaded term: It refers to the literal
possibility that women will be allowed to enter the school, but it also
suggests that VMI may have feared that the "admission" -in the sense of
acknowledgment or concession--of women's abilities could downgrade the
school by puncturing the carefully constructed myths of male superiority on
which the system is founded.72 "Hardly" likewise plays two roles, and its
significance is emphasized by the fact that it is repeated. On the one hand, it
offers a normative assessment of the great difficulty-in the sense of
"hard" going-of proving such an argument. At the same time, it makes
Justice Ginsburg's own argument that VlMI's protestations of impossibility
69. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 542-43 (emphasis added) (footnotes and citation
omitted).
70. See id. at 541 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725
(1982)).
71. "Notion" means a "thought or idea" but is distinguished from other synonyms for
"idea" as one that is "vague, general, or even fanciful." AMEICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 895 (3d ed. 1992). "Notion" has a secondary meaning of a "fanciful
impulse; a whim." Ia at 1238.
72. Jack Balkin has persuasively argued that status groups-which in the context of the VMI
litigation break down along gender lines according to the experts' statements that compare and
contrast their learning ability-fiercely compete to keep an existing status hierarchy because
status is a zero-sum game: A gain in the status of one group is a relative decrease in the status of
those defined in reference to it. See J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313,
2328 (1997). For a less theoretical perspective, compare Justice Ginsburg's characterization of the
school's protestations to a tongue-in-cheek passage from Virginia Woolf s A Room of One's Own:
Women have served all these centuries as looking-glasses possessing the magic and
delicious power of reflecting the figure of man at twice its natural size. . .. That is why
Napoleon and Mussolini both insist so emphatically upon the inferiority of women, for
if they were not inferior, they would cease to enlarge.... How is [man] to go on giving
judgement, civilising natives, making laws, writing books, dressing up and
speechifying at banquets, unless he can see himself at breakfast and dinner at least
twice the size he really is?
VIRGINIA WOOLF, A RoOMi OF ONE'S OwN 53-54 (Hogarth Press 1929).
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are like other self-fulfilling prophecies of doom-prophecies that turned out
to be false.
The introductory sentence's form thus mirrors its function: It introduces
negative precedent that works through a process of double entendre.
Negative precedent stated (with unshakeable confidence) as "right" is
understood as "wrong." Again, the negative precedent is presented without
qualification or disclaimer. The following examples are privileged as
lengthy block quotations in the text of the opinion:
On women entering law, 1876: Their child-rearing responsibilities
"forbid[] that they shall bestow that time (early and late) and labor,
so essential in attaining to the eminence to which the true lawyer
should ever aspire. It cannot therefore be said that the opposition of
courts to the admission of females to practice... is to any extent
the outgrowth of... 'old fogeyism[.]' ... [lit arises rather from a
comprehension of the magnitude of the responsibilities connected
with the successful practice of law, and a desire to grade up the
profession." 73
On women entering law school, 1925: Columbia Law School's
faculty "never maintained that women could not master legal
learning.... No, its argument has been.., more practical. If
women were admitted to the Columbia Law School, [the faculty]
said, then the choicer, more manly and red-blooded graduates of
our great universities would go to the Harvard Law School!"74
On women entering medical school, 1869: "'God forbid that I
should ever see men and women aiding each other to display with
the scalpel the secrets of the reproductive system." 75
These vintage examples fit within the same general category as the
evidence given by Virginia's witnesses: They are statements by experts
who acknowledge that women are capable of participating at some level in
a given activity but who assert that this level of participation would have
adverse effects on the profession and on the relation between the sexes.
Throughout history, such statements have been used to keep women out of
certain occupations and activities; VMI sought to use them in the same
way. Eventually, however, each of these professions was successfully
integrated and the naysayers' predictions of dire consequences were
73. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 543 (quoting In re Dorsett, SYLLABI, Oct. 21, 1876,
at 5 (Minn. C.P. Hennepin County, 1876)).
74. Id. at 543-44 (quoting NATiON, Feb. 18, 1925, at 173).
75. I. at 544 (quoting MARY ROTH WALSH, DOCTORS WANTED: No WOMEN NEED APPLY,
121-22 (1977) (quoting Edward H. Clarke, Medical Education of Women, 4 BOSTON MED. &
SuRG. J. 345,346 (1869))).
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discredited. VMI's claims about the detrimental effect that the admission of
women would have on the adversative method were "hardly different"
from such false prophecies. Thus, by analogy, Justice Ginsburg suggested
that VMI's claims were illegitimate.76
Even without qualification, each of the sex-based generalizations listed
above can be immediately recognized as inaccurate. Women were able to
enter law and medicine successfully, and the institution and practice of the
professions remained unsullied. Thus, assessing the examples and
recognizing their erroneousness demonstrates how to read such assertions
with the "skeptical scrutiny" that Justice Ginsburg's formulation of the
intermediate scrutiny test requires. The dated-and dramatically
disproved-examples prepare the reader to evaluate with a similarly
skeptical eye more recent forms of discrimination that are also purportedly
justified by the requirements of the industry and the necessity of
maintaining decency.
Justice Ginsburg then provided one modem example of such exclusion
in the text of the opinion:
More recently, women seeking careers in policing encountered
resistance based on fears that their presence would "undermine
male solidarity," deprive male partners of adequate assistance, and
lead to sexual misconduct. Field studies did not confirm these
fears.77
Warnings of the supposed dangers of admitting women into the federal
service academies (the experiences that many would find most relevant to
evaluating the legitimacy of VMI's claims) are relegated to a footnote.78
Justice Ginsburg showed that like the doctors, lawyers, and policemen, the
military officers predicted that admitting women to the academies would
downgrade the profession: "It is my considered judgment that the
76. Justice Ginsburg made the connection between the historical assertions and the modem
assertions explicit in a footnote that followed the introductory statement about self-fulfilling
prophecies. In the note, she moved directly from quoting the state's expert witness David Riesman
on the likelihood that the admission of women would eventually cause VMI to drop the
adversative system all together, see id. at 542 n.12 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F.
Supp. 1407, 1413 (W.D. Va. 1994)), to a 19th-century Virginia state senator's depiction "in
burning eloquence [of] the terrible consequences" that a law protecting married women's property
rights would produce. Id. (quoting 10 EDUC. J. VA. 213 (1879)). A year after the bill passed, the
bill's sponsor reported triumphantly "that 'not one of [the forecast 'terrible consequences'] has or
ever will happen, even unto the sounding of Gabriel's trumpet."' Id.
77. Idl at 544 (citations omitted) (quoting FRANCES HEiDENSOHN, WOMEN IN CONTROL?
201 (1992); and citing PETER B. BLOCH & DEBORAH ANDERSON, POLICEWOMEN ON PATROL:
FINAL REPORT (1974); CATHERINE MILTON ET AL., WOMEN IN POLICING 32-33 (1974)).
78. See id. at 542 n.11.
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introduction of female cadets will inevitably erode this vital atmosphere" ;79
"[a]dmitting women to West Point would irrevocably change the
Academy.... The Spartan atmosphere-which is so important to
producing the final product-would surely be diluted, and would in all
probability disappear."80
The modem examples cannot stand on their own as negative precedent.
There is not yet consensus about the rightness or wrongness of the
predictions. (In fact, the district court and Justice Scalia both relied on the
modem military testimony as grounds for continuing VMI's exclusionary
practices.)8" Thus, Justice Ginsburg did not leave the officers' predictions of
doom unqualified; rather, she carefully provided "proof' of their
inaccuracy. Female cadets have graduated at the top of their class at each
federal military academy;" women have been raised to positions of
responsibility;83 and male cadets have become increasingly accepting of
women and increasingly comfortably seeing them not as "women" but as
"classmates." s' These modem illustrations have neither the prominence in
the opinion nor the rhetorical power of the past examples. Their strength
comes from the analogy that Justice Ginsburg has already constructed:
They fit within a universe of negative precedent that she has shown to be
discredited.
Justice Ginsburg's final statement of the issue was understated:
Women's successful entry into the federal military academies, and
their participation in the Nation's military forces, indicate that
Virginia's fears for the future of VMI may not be solidly grounded.
The State's justification for excluding all women from "citizen-
soldier" training for which some are qualified, in any event, cannot
rank as "exceedingly persuasive," as we have explained and
applied that standardY
79. Id. (quoting Hearings on H.R. 9832, H.R. 10705, and Related Bills Regarding Equal
Admission to the Service Academies Before the Subcomm. No. 2 on Military Personnel of the
House Comm. on Armed Servs., 93rd Cong. 137 (1975) (statement of Lt. Gen. Albert P. Clark,
Superintendent of U.S. Air Force Academy)).
80. Id. (quoting Hearings on H.R. 9832, H.R. 10705, and Related Bills Regarding Equal
Admission to the Service Academies Before the Subcomm. No. 2 on Military Personnel of the
House Comm. on Armed Servs., 93rd Cong. 165 (1975) (statement of Hon. Howard H. Callaway,
Secretary of the Army)).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1412; 518 U.S. at 589 n.5 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
82. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,544 n.13 (1996).
83. See id. at 544 n.14.
84. Il at 545 n.15 (quoting A. VrrrERs, U.S. MiLrrARY ACADEMY, REPORT OF ADMISSION
OF WoMEN 84 (1978)).
85. Id. at 544-45 (citations omitted).
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As noted at the outset of this discussion, it was impossible in the course of
the litigation to assess accurately the legitimacy of the catch-22. Justice
Ginsburg did not (and could not) conclusively prove that the VI
administrators were wrong. Rather, her negative construction (" the fears
may not be solidly grounded") summed up the argument she made from
negative precedent. She laid out examples showing that VMI's claims that
the admission of women would downgrade the school fit within a larger
category of predictions of doom that have been disproved. The inference is
clear. The negative precedent discredits the present claims.
IV. NEGATIVE PRECEDENT: RECASTING THE PAST
Part III described how the past can be used to argue, through a process
of negative inference, against present claims. Part IV focuses on the
backward-looking use of negative precedent. As discussed in Part I,
precedent promotes fairness, predictability, and efficiency, while also
expressing society's intergenerational memory. In many cases, however,
the fairness, predictability, and efficiency objectives have given way to
other considerations-such as a changing understanding of equality-
thereby rendering the past decisions no longer determinative. The standard
of scrutiny applied to equal protection challenges to gender-based
classifications obviously has evolved over the past century. Historical
practices that once passed rational basis review might now be decided
differently under intermediate or skeptical scrutiny. Does the history that
occurred under the past legal regime still matter? Should it affect decisions
made today?
If legal decisions are viewed purely as legal rules, there is no reason to
refer to outdated decisions. Indeed, acknowledging that change has
occurred in the past suggests the possibility of change in the future, thus
undermining the illusion of stability that the rule of precedent promotes. In
other words, precedent advances efficiency and predictability best by
ignoring no-longer-controlling case law. But a legal decision also has a
"historical" impact. Constructive amnesia thus has costs: It cuts off the
present from the community of the past. Negative precedent provides an
alternative approach that recognizes the effects of a decision that now
seems wrong. A comparison Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in
United States v. Virginia to Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion illustrates
these two approaches.
Chief Justice Rehnquist took the formalistic legal approach.' He began
his concurrence by emphasizing the period in which the standard of
scrutiny had been (relatively) stable:
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Two decades ago in Craig v. Boren we announced that " [t]o
withstand constitutional challenge .... classification by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives." We have
adhered to that standard of scrutiny ever since.
86
This initial statement of the intermediate scrutiny standard suggests that it
emerged out of thin air; it promotes the illusion of an unchanging rule. The
Chief Justice then provided a solid column of citations, completely denuded
of narrative, to subsequent cases in which this standard was used.87 Again,
there was no hint of the women affected by this standard; there was no hint
of the "historical" impact of any given decision. This was purely a "legal"
rule-no more, no less.
Of course, the institution of VMI predated intermediate scrutiny.
Looking at history through a legal lens, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded that the institution's historical actions should be ignored. He
began by observing, accurately, that VMI's policies were not
unconstitutional in 1839, when the "adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, with its Equal Protection Clause, was nearly 30 years in the
future" and when "[t]he interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to
require heightened scrutiny for gender discrimination was yet another
century away." After briefly reviewing rational basis review, he noted that
Reed v. Reed,89 the first case to uphold a woman's challenge to a gender
classification under rational basis review, was a seminal case. But he
asserted that since Reed had "nothing to do with admissions to any sort of
educational institution," officials at VMI were justified in assuming that the
decision did not affect the constitutionality of the school's single-sex
status.9" He concluded that the Court should not consider any evidence that
predated the Court's decision in Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan," reasoning that since this was the first case "actually involving a
single-sex admissions policy in higher education" it was the first case that
"place[d] Virginia on notice that VMI's men-only admissions policy was
open to serious question." 92
Chief Justice Rehnquist's concern with "notice" reflects the challenge
posed by the evolution of legal rules. A system premised on precedent
promises consistent decisions that allow institutions to plan around a
predictable set of rules. To be "fair" to the institutions, actions that predate
86. Id. at 558 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citation omitted).
87. See id. at 558-59 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
88. Il (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
89. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
90. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 560 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
91. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
92. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 561 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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the legal standard should not be held against them. From a purely formal
standpoint, the Chief Justice has a point.93 Certainly, VI could not be held
legally accountable-in the sense of being assessed damages-for the
historical actions it performed under the color of law. But the effects of an
action are real, whether they are judged constitutional or unconstitutional.
Today, exclusion on the basis of sex is seen as causing a harm; in the past,
such exclusion, while legal, caused the same harm. Without imposing
retroactive liability, negative precedent acknowledges past injuries caused
by discrimination that now seems unacceptable.
Where Chief Justice Rehnquist implicitly relied on the fiction of a static
rule of law, Justice Ginsburg presented heightened scrutiny as emerging out
of rational basis review: "Today's skeptical scrutiny of official action
denying rights or opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of
history,"9 4 for, as she reminded us, "our Nation has had a long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination." 95 She went on to spell out this
history in a fair amount of detail, emphasizing the large part of this history
during which women were excluded: "Through a century plus three
decades and more of that history," women were denied the vote.9 6 The
repeated conjunctions joining the discrete units of time rhetorically draws
out the time: a century plus three decades and more sounds significantly
longer than 133 years. She added that, for another half century, gender
classifications that withheld opportunities from women were upheld so long
as "any 'basis in reason' could be conceived." 97 Again the wording she
chose underscored her point that this standard was exceedingly low:
Accepting "any 'basis in reason' [that] could be conceived' sounds much
easier to satisfy than a "rational-basis review."
Reaching the portion of the story where things began to change, Justice
Ginsburg again stressed both that government bodies, under the color of
law, denied women equal opportunities and that, finally, the Court played a
role in striking such statutes down: "In 1971, for the first time in our
Nation's history, this Court ruled in favor of a woman who complained that
her State had denied her the equal protection of its laws."" Justice
Ginsburg gave examples of a few of the cases following Reed in which the
93. Although one could quibble with Chief Justice Rehnquist's assertion that the starting date
should be Hogan rather than Reed or, at the very least, Craig, which announced heightened
scrutiny for all classifications on the basis of gender. Note that this is a question of the scope of a
shift in the law; the question is how broadly the universe of Xs should be defined. See supra text
accompanying notes 9, 19.
94. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (emphasis added).
95. Id (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)).
96. Id.
97. Id (citing Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464,467 (1948)).
98. Id at 532 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,73 (1971)).
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Court struck down gender classifications.99 Whereas Chief Justice
Rehnquist included an imposing column of bare case citations that
emphasized the legal rule, Justice Ginsburg identified a few examples of
intermediate scrutiny and included with each citation a relatively lengthy
parenthetical providing the context of the case and the language the Court
used to define the injury such discrimination caused."° Rather than
subscribing to the myth of an unchanging rule, Justice Ginsburg underlined
the long period during which the now controlling intermediate scrutiny
standard was not in operation and the considerable effect that the change
had for women in all aspects of society.
The contrast between Chief Justice Rehnquist's characterization of the
traditional intermediate scrutiny standard as an authoritative
"announcement" in a vacuum and Justice Ginsburg's characterization of
the standard as a "response" to volumes of history probably stems in part
from the emphasis Justice Ginsburg placed on the "exceedingly
persuasive" language. The Chief Justice recognized that the skeptical
scrutiny standard is-at least arguably-more stringent than the traditional
intermediate scrutiny test, and he did not want the standard raised. He
therefore wanted to stress the static nature of that rule. Justice Ginsburg, by
contrast, seems to have advocated nudging the standard towards strict
scrutiny. Spelling out the move from complete disregard for women to
rational basis review to intermediate scrutiny built momentum and thus
bolstered her suggestion that the Court may be close to employing strict
scrutiny for gender-based classifications. 0' But the contrast also reveals a
deeper divide about the appropriate application of the legal rule when the
legal standard has shifted. Chief Justice Rehnquist's approach emphasized
the "legal" import of the past decisions; nothing that predated the current
rule was relevant. Justice Ginsburg's approach emphasized the "historical"
effect of the past decisions.
The key here is not just that rational basis review permitted decisions
that would now be considered to have been based on unreasonable
prejudice, but also that the courts themselves enforced societal
discrimination. Justice Ginsburg illustrated this by citing Goesaert v.
Cleary" as an example of the now-rejected rational basis review:"'
99. See id. (citing Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 462-63 (1981); Stanton v. Stanton,
421 U.S. 7, 95 (1975)).
100. This technique supplies narrative weight that otherwise would be entirely lacking in the
Government's case because of the absence of individual plaintiffs. Cf Vojdik, supra note 26, at 8-
12 (arguing that the Government was disadvantaged because it was unable to use narrative to
engender sympathy).
101. See supra note 46.
102. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
103. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532. Chief Justice Rehnquist, responding to
Justice Ginsburg's Goesaert reference, dismissed it as a "now abandoned view" that was not
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See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary (rejecting challenge of female tavern
owner and her daughter to Michigan law denying bartender licenses
to females--except for wives and daughters of male tavern owners;
Court would not 'give ear' to the contention that 'an unchivalrous
desire of male bartenders to... monopolize the calling' prompted
the legislation)."
Her wording underlined that the Court played an active role in allowing sex
discrimination to continue: "[The] Court would not 'give ear' to the
[women's] contention."1 5 For Justice Ginsburg, Goesaert is negative
precedent. Women who wanted to tend bar, like women who wanted to
become doctors or lawyers, were denied an opportunity solely on the basis
of their sex. Under intermediate scrutiny, a court would have found that this
Michigan statute violated equal protection; under rational basis review,
however, the Court found that it did not. The changing legal standard does
not change the historical truth: The exclusion injured women. Chief Justice
Rehnquist ignored a history of discrimination to promote formal legal
fairness; Justice Ginsburg emphasized a history of discrimination to
recognize real historic wrongs.
V. THE ABSOLUTE VALUE OF PRECEDENT
As discussed in Part IV, Justice Ginsburg's opinion demonstrated that
the country's history of discrimination was explicitly sanctioned by the
judicial and political institutions. Yet obviously there are other aspects of
the country's history that are worth preserving. By implicitly
acknowledging that the dictates of the past need not be followed
unquestioningly, negative precedent allows the possibility of a reference to
history that both recognizes past achievements and acknowledges past
mistakes. This Part begins by demonstrating that the past is neither
inherently "positive" nor "negative" and that a single example may be
"mention[ed]" in-and implicitly therefore not connected to-Reed's "brief opinion." l. at 560,
561 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). For him, Goesaert was irrelevant. See also infra text
accompanying note 107 (arguing that inherent in an example presented as negative precedent is
the danger that it could be read as positive precedent).
104. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 (citation omitted).
105. In the majority opinion for the Hogan case, Justice O'Connor similarly used Goesaert as
negative precedent:
History provides numerous examples of legislative attempts to exclude women from
particular areas simply because legislators believed women were less able than men to
perform a particular function.... [The Court in Goesaert v. Cleary upheld a
legislature's right to preclude women from bartending, except under limited
circumstances, on the ground that the legislature could devise preventive measures
against 'moral and social problems' that result when women, but apparently not men,
tend bar.
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,725 n.10 (1982) (citation omitted).
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traditional precedent to some and negative precedent to others. It then
contrasts Justice Scalia's homily to tradition with Justice Ginsburg's story
of state-sanctioned exclusion, concluding that a richer understanding of
tradition as both positive and negative allows progress without requiring a
radical disassociation from the past.10
6
Since history's meaning is inherently contestable, the use of negative
precedent can backfire. To be effective, negative precedent must establish
both that a given past decision was wrong and that a current controversy is
relevantly similar to the past decision. The argument can fail at either of
these steps. First, an example presented as negative precedent could be read
as positive precedent. 7 While this outcome may be particularly likely
where there is not consensus about the "wrongness" of a given decision,
standards of scrutiny should help control the valence of such examples. In
other words, skeptical scrutiny posits a presumption of illegitimacy that
should disqualify challenged classifications that are based on anachronistic
assumptions about the capabilities of women or other protected classes.
Second, a reader could recognize that the past decision was discredited but
not accept that the current situation was relevantly similar. Ironically, this
danger may be greatest where the past decision is most clearly rejected: A
current contested practice may not look particularly "evil" when compared
to past decisions that are now considered to have been egregious
mistakes.03 Either of these possible misreadings is potentially significant.
Parts I and IV demonstrate, however, that an argument from negative
precedent offers benefits that can outweigh the risks.
106. See generally Bartlett, supra note 2 (arguing that feminists should understand tradition
and change as mutually embodied rather than as opposites).
107. For example, Justice Ginsburg used Goeseart v. Cleary in her discussion of the standard
of scrutiny as a marker against which to measure change. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
at 531; see also supra text accompanying notes 103-105 (analyzing Justice Ginsburg's use of
Goeseart). Justice Scalia reacted to Justice Ginsburg's push to move the standard toward strict
scrutiny by stating that if the standard were open to reconsideration, the "stronger argument"
would be for returning to rational basis review because it was "routinely applied" through much
of our history. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 575 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For Justice
Ginsburg, Goeseart was negative; for Justice Scalia, it was positive. Since it is unlikely that
rational basis review will be reinstated for gender-based classifications, Justice Ginsburg's use of
Goesaert was rather safe.
108. In an article exploring the shifting rhetoric of status regulation, Reva Siegel argued that
retrospective condemnation of past decisions (such as the Supreme Court's recent statement that
"Plessy was wrong the day it was decided," Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863
(1992)) may exonerate current practices. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer
Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L REV. 1111, 1111-13
(1997). This is properly understood as a failed argument from negative precedent, and Siegel's
insight underlines the necessity of clearly establishing categories of relevance. Cf Ariela J. Gross,
Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE
L.J. 109, 182-84 (1998) (arguing that depicting 19th-century racism as a pseudo-scientific
phenomenon unrelated to modem racism unjustifiably allows modem society to distance itself
from the past).
[Vol. 108: 237
19981 Re-viewing History 265
The reverse phenomenon may be true as well: A past example
presented as a positive precedent may actually strike some as a negative
precedent. Justice Scalia, convinced that the Court's decision marked the
death of VI, 0 9 ended his dissent with a eulogy. Speaking with yearning of
the past as a time of "old-fashioned concepts" like "manly 'honor,"' he
paid homage to "The Code of a Gentleman" found at the back of a booklet
traditionally given to the first-year cadets:
"Without a strict observance of the fundamental Code of Honor, no
man, no matter how 'polished,' can be considered a gentleman. The
honor of a gentleman demands the inviolability of his word, and the
incorruptibility of his principles. He is the descendant of the knight,
the crusader, he is the defender of the defenseless and the champion
of justice.., or he is not a Gentleman.
A Gentleman ...
Does not speak more than casually about his girl friend.
Does not go to a lady's house if he is affected by alcohol.
Does not hall a lady from a club window.
A gentleman never discusses the merits and demerits of a lady.
Does not slap strangers on the back nor so much as lay a finger
on a lady.
A Gentleman can become what he wills to be... [." 1o
Justice Scalia recognized that these sentiments are somewhat anachronistic,
but he nevertheless mourned their passing:
I do not know whether the men of VMI lived by this Code; perhaps
not. But it is powerfully impressive that a public institution of
higher education still in existence sought to have them do so. I do
not think any of us, women included, will be better off for its
destruction."'
Justice Scalia included the Code in his opinion as a quasi-precedent, as a
tradition from the past worth preserving. But he was overbroad in his
endorsement. For many readers, men and women both, the Code itself is
negative precedent-and the fact that VMI still purported to live by it
109. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today the Court
shuts down an institution that has served the people of the Commonwealth with pride and
distinction for over a century and a half.").
110. Id. at 602-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting). These quotations are selectively edited from the
text of the Code of the Gentleman that Justice Scalia provided.
111. Id. at 603 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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strengthened the case against the school. Women do not need to be
protected by the descendant of the knight, the crusader, the champion of
justice. The world of the Code is a world of "'romantic paternalism,'
which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage."
11 2
Equal protection jurisprudence instructs judges to eradicate, rather than
glorify, such vestiges of romantic paternalism.
At the same time, "honor" still merits respect. There are aspects of the
Code-and, more generally, of the school and of the tradition out of which
it came, that are worth preserving. Negative precedent allows reference to a
past tradition without requiring conservative adherence to its dictates." 3
Citing historical precedent both for male-only military schools and for
single-sex education in general, Justice Scalia concluded: "The all-male
constitution of VI comes squarely within such a governing tradition," and
thus he claimed that interpreting the Equal Protection Clause to require
coeducation is "not the interpretation of the Constitution, but the creation
of one." 4 This was clearly meant as an insult, but his wording (perhaps
unintentionally) serves as a reminder that an all-male "Constitution" also
sits squarely within our "governing tradition." Justice Ginsburg offered a
richer understanding of the country's "governing tradition," one that
recognized that it is neither entirely positive nor entirely negative.
Justice Ginsburg began her analysis of the case by noting that for more
than a century, "women did not count among voters composing 'We the
People."' "" Her first footnote in this section quoted Thomas Jefferson as
stating "the view prevailing when the Constitution was new":
"Were our State a pure democracy ... there would yet be excluded
from their deliberations ... women, who, to prevent depravation of
morals and ambiguity of issue, should not mix promiscuously in the
public meetings of men." 116
Her final footnote mirrored the first. She quoted John Adams similarly
describing the dangers of opening up the political process to women:
112. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973). Such stereotypes also limit men's
options. For example, Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), the
closest precedent for the VMI decision, was an effort by a man to gain access to an all-female
nursing school.
113. Cf. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 568 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[I]n my view the
function of this Court is to preserve our society's value regarding (among other things) equal
protection, not to revise them.").
114. la- at 569,570 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 531.
116. l at 531 n.5 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (Sept. 5,
1816), in 10 WRrrNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 45-46, n.1 (New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons
1899)).
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"[I]t is dangerous to open so fiuitful a source of controversy and
altercation as would be opened by attempting to alter the
qualifications of voters; there will be no end of it. New claims will
arise: women will demand a vote; ... It tends to confound and
destroy all distinctions, and prostrate all ranks to one common
level." 117
She turned over the bedrocks of our national tradition-the founding fathers
and the Constitution itself-to expose what are now familiar themes:
Women must be protected from politics and politics must be protected from
the debasement that women's inclusion would cause. Politicians, like
lawyers, doctors, and educators, relied on generalizations about women that
have been since proven erroneous.
Justice Ginsburg did not entirely discredit history. Her use of negative
precedent emphasized that even those who respect the achievements of past
leaders should recognize that their actions excluded women. They caused a
real and significant injury-both to the women who wanted to participate in
government and to the nation that could have benefited from their
contributions."' Acknowledging discrimination in this sense is
constructive. By recounting the country's "long and unfortunate history of
sex discrimination," ' 9 Justice Ginsburg "created" 12 -- or, more accurately,
recognized-an alternative history of the women and men who broke down
gender-based distinctions throughout society. As John Adams suggested,
women who fought their way into the professions "tend[ed] to confound
and destroy all distinctions." But they did not "prostrate all ranks to one
common level." 2' Rather they worked to elevate all ranks to one superior
level. These women have already demonstrated their ability to succeed in
an adversative environment. They too are part of a national history worth
honoring.
VI. EPILOGUE: LOOKING BACKWARD To MovE FORWARD
It is always difficult to gauge the practical effect of a rhetorical tool
such as negative precedent. The officials at VMI may have noticed no more
about the opinion than that it required them to change their school-or they
117. Id. at 557 n.21 (citing RICHARD B. MORRIs, THE FORGING OF THE UNION, 1781-1789,
at 191 (1987) (quoting Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26, 1776), in 9 WORKS
OF JOHN ADAMS 378 (Boston, Little Brown 1854))).
118. Cf. id. at 532 (" [N]either federal nor state government acts compatibly with the equal
protection principle when a law or official policy denies to women, simply because they are
women, full citizenship stature--equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and
contribute to society based on their individual talents and capacities." (emphasis added)).
119. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
121. See supra text accompanying note 117.
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may have recognized that the negative precedent Justice Ginsburg provided
could serve as a model for reform. Justice Ginsburg concluded her opinion
by professing a belief that the school could be changed to include women:
VMI's story continued as our comprehension of We the People
expanded.12 There is no reason to believe that the admission of
women capable of all the activities required of VMI cadets would
destroy the Institute rather than enhance its capacity to serve the
"more Perfect Union."
Again, her peroration was phrased in the negative: "There is no reason to
believe . . . ." The Court could impose, by judicial fiat, a standard of
skeptical scrutiny that was sensitive to the anachronistic assumptions about
women implicit in the school's objections to integration. It could force the
school to admit women or relinquish public funding. But it could not, itself,
change the minds of the men involved.
After losing in the Supreme Court, VMI's Board of Visitors considered
refusing public funding so that the school could remain single-sex.'24
Instead, the Board voted nine to eight to accept women."z And, to their
credit, the same school officials who had protested vigorously that
coeducation was impossible did their best to lay the groundwork for
successful integration. Virginia provided $5.1 million, which was used to
recruit women, hire staff, and make necessary physical changes, such as
building separate bathrooms. 26 Noting that isolation and stress were among
the factors cited by Shannon Faulkner as reasons for her much-publicized
departure from the Citadel, VMI's superintendent, Josiah Bunting I,
consciously tried to recruit enough women-in his words, a "critical
mass"-to provide support for each other." He also required the 1200
male cadets and 400 male employees already at the school to attend
seminars on sexual harassment)2
On August 18, 1997, thirty women joined the 430 men enrolling as
cadets. 29 Officials expressed confidence that they were ready-that
coeducation at VMI would succeed. 3' In a speech made to the crowd of
122. An omitted citation refers to a discussion of the school's successful integration of
African Americans. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 546 n.16.
123. Il at 557-58 (citations omitted).
124. See Peter Finn, Year of the Female Rat; 30 Women Enroll at VMI, All-Male Since 1839,
WASH. PosT, Aug. 19, 1997, at Dl.
125. See First Female Cadets at V.M.L Are in Class and in Uniform, N.Y. TMIES, Aug. 19,
1997, at A17.
126. See id.
127. William H. Honan, The Man with the Plan: "You Learn What To Avoid," N.Y. TIMIES,
Apr. 6, 1997, § 4A (Educ. Life Supplement), at 27.
128. See Women To Join VMI Ranks, NEWSDAY, Aug. 18, 1997, at A15.
129. See Finn, supra note 124.
130. See id.
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incoming cadets and their nervous families, Major General Bunting added
sex as a trait that the school was now ready to consider irrelevant in its
radically egalitarian approach: "'VMI does not care if you are poor or rich,
if you are white or black, female or male, Taiwanese or Finn or
Virginian .... We care only about your heart, your integrity and your
determination."'"131
The school seems to have risen to the challenge. In March of 1998, the
traditional six months of intimidation and abuse ended for the first coed
class of "rats." 132 And twenty-three of the thirty women, as well as 361 of
the 430 men, who had enrolled in the fall claimed their place as full-fledged
cadets. 133 Officials, students, and alumni classified the changes required to
accommodate women-shades for windows in the dorms and a policy on
jewelry included in the student handout-as "mostly cosmetic." 1 As
paraphrased in one account, Commandant of Cadets James Joyner said "the
bar was not lowered, and women proved themselves equal to the school's
traditions." 1
35
Negative precedent is ultimately about the possibility of change. An
appropriate remedy for a constitutional violation strives to "eliminate [so
far as possible] the discriminatory effects of the past" and to "bar like
discrimination in the future." 136 Neither endowments and gyms nor prestige
and tradition could be manufactured on demand. There was no way that
Virginia could create an institution that would eliminate the discriminatory
effects of VMI's past exclusions or bar similar discrimination in the future.
Likewise, negative precedent cannot literally repair the past. But by
recognizing a history of discrimination that has now been left behind,
Justice Ginsburg's opinion in the VMI case serves as a model for ongoing
efforts to realize progress. The doctors, lawyers, and politicians stated, like
the officials at VMI, that they thought change would be impossible. They
were proven wrong. Their experiences showed the leaders of VMI that a
"tradition!' of excellence could be expanded to include women. By looking
towards the past, negative precedent offers a vision of success for the
future.
13 1. Id. Bunting was well aware that the school would be under intense media scrutiny. Other
comments he made suggested his embrace of women and endorsement of tolerance was at least
partially motivated by more pragmatic concerns: "Any activity that is seen to be nefarious or
untoward will be on CNN in Sacramento five minutes after it happens in Lexington." Women to
Join VMI Ranks, supra note 128.
132. 23 Women Endure VMI "Rat" Hazing, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 18, 1998, at A10; Women
Reach End of VMI Rat Line, NEWSDAY, Mar. 18, 1998, at A23.
133. See Women Reach End of VMI Rat Line, supra note 132, at A23.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 548 (quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S.
145, 154 (1965)).
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